Rethinking Iraq, Pt. II

What are the lessons of 9.11?

1. The American mainland (along with Western countries generally) is vulnerable to devastating attack. The strength of our society – its “openness” - is also its Achilles Heel.

2. The only thing worse than 9.11 would be a similar attack involving WMD. Thanks to globalization, miniaturization of technology, ubiquity of telecommunications, and the pestilence of “rogue” and “failed” states (not to mention the advent of zealots eager to “martyr” themselves in acts of devastation), the confluence of terrorism and WMD becomes ever more likely.

3. Marriages of convenience with despots – a regrettable expedient of the cold war, and one of the givens of Realpolitik anyhow – have had a “terror dividend”: while the tyrants were providing a bulwark against sovietization (or some other threat), their repression of their populations was building powerful internal pressure. Islamism is, in part, a reaction to such oppression.

4. We've got an enormous problem with the Muslim world in general – the umma – and the Middle East in particular.

Note that this analysis differs from the narrow interpretation which views September 11 as entailing simply that we've got a fairly determinate enemy – Al Qaeda – against whom we must take some fairly obvious actions ('War on Terror'). By contrast I take the overall point to be that we are in an unprecedented existential situation: on the cusp of the the age of “megaterrorism,” to use Walter Laqueur's riveting locution.

(I acknowledge and simply pass by the “radical chic” claim that 9.11 represented some kind of long-germinating comeuppance for past American misdeeds).

Points 1 & 2 underscore the imperative of a vigorously “proactive” security posture – especially, to punish the perpetrators, take stock anew of friends and foes, and extend every effort to thwart the unthinkable. Points 3 & 4 entail a need to promote aggressively some manner of “free” government and institutions around the world, especially in the Middle East (and more generally to re-cast our relationship to that region), thus defusing the appeal of radicalism.

Now, there need be no evidence of Iraqi involvement in the massacre of 9.11 to draw a firm “connection” between that day and history in the wake of the '91 Gulf War. None other than Bin Laden himself has cited American policy towards Iraq as constituting his prime list of grievances/causi belli:

(A) The policy of sanctions, upon which he (and many others) directly laid the blame for Iraqi infant mortality throughout the '90's

(B) The garrisoning of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to prevent the military expansion of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Such is offensive to “orthodox” Muslims, as it entailed the presence of infidels in “The Land of the Two Holy Places.”

Even in Bin Laden's third lament – U.S. support for Israel as against the Palestinian Arabs – the conflict with Iraq is germane, as surely one way Saddam Hussein indirectly avenged himself upon the U.S. has been to foment maximal discord in the recent Intifada, by sponsoring suicidal terrorists. Unsurprisingly, this has pushed the U.S. and Israel closer together, thus exacerbating tensions that have long simmered over the “question of Palestine.”

(Note that another of Bin Laden's grievances - in a real sense, the primary one - is simply that Western Society isn't disciplined by the Shari'a (Muslim holy law) – an inconvenient fact usually glossed-over by commentators which seek predominantly to blame the U.S. for having earned Al Qaeda's ire).

Hence, on Bin Laden's reckoning, we have purchased the “containment” of Iraq at the cost of whatever modicum of good will existed towards the U.S. in the Middle East of late – and increased exponentially the “passive sympathy” which seems to exist there for Al Qaeda. For the danger of Islamism isn't simply its own directly murderous potential, but also the extent to which it is viewed with a kind of aggrieved, sentimental “understanding” by those in whose name it purports to speak. If ever a policy illustrated the tragic character of international relations for a reasonably “moral” nation, this is it: a classic example of not being able to fill one hole without opening another, thereby unavoidably incurring a kind of “guilt.”

One might credit the foregoing with establishing some kind of loose “link” between Iraq and the threat from Al Qaeda, yet insist that it signally fails to establish how Iraq might be viewed as any kind of a greater threat “in light of 9.11.”

Such a critic would do well to entertain the following rhetorical question: “Of what country are the following considerations jointly true: (1) It has shown a voracious appetite for the development and possession of WMD, and is unique in having used them repeatedly in recent times (2) It has sponsored International terrorism for decades (including known cases of having sent its own agents/proxies across international borders) (3) Historically and Geographically, it lies at the heart of the Middle East, and has laid claim to a special role within the 'Arab Nation' (4) Its reckless leader has borne enormous ill-will towards the United States and its allies, owing to the fact that it has been in a de facto state of war with them since 1991? "

If one then objects that “this all was true throughout the '80's, and we didn't consider Iraq a 'threat' then, indeed we viewed Saddam Hussein as a kind of 'ally',” it must be emphasized in response that the last point is (again) decisive. In the '80's we were not at war with Iraq, and hence hadn't yet earned Hussein's enmity. The difference from the '90's onward was one of kind, not simply of degree.

Therefore, juxtaposing the rhetorical question alongside the lessons of September 11 cited above, the grave need - at the least - to revisit the issues surrounding the conflict with Iraq becomes almost self-evidently clear.

(For example, the question ought to cast in a more favorable light the much-maligned “attempt” - in the language of hostile commentators – of the U.S. administration to try to prove that Iraq might have been involved in 9.11. For, it would be downright remiss of the authorities not to look long and hard at the possibility that a long-standing enemy from the Middle East, with the history and qualities of Iraq, could have had a hand in such an attack; and others, too, such Dar es Salaam and Nairobi).

The point at issue isn't that, somehow, post-9.11 Iraq all-of-a-sudden “became” a threat to the U.S. As I aim to show presently, it had indeed been a threat all along (since '91), but 9.11 was the shocker to underscore just how potent the threat has been – and why it would have been foolhardy to tolerate the status quo any longer. That said, the real sense in which September 11 might be taken to entail an “increased” threat from Iraq will be considered in my next installment.

In closing I will quote at length from “The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security,” by Richard Butler, the last chairman of UNSCOM ('97-'98), and former Australian Ambassador to the UN. Note that this book was published in 2000 (with a new preface in March 2001), by an author with decidedly non-”right wing”/”neoconservative” credentials, and hence can in no way be taken to evince post-9.11 hysteria.

“Missile, bomber, artillery shell, even crop duster: All are means of delivery for the chemical weapons built and, in some cases, used by Saddam. But there are not the only ways to kill with chemical weapons ...

"Given Saddam's track record on chemical weapons and their use and his attitude towards the West, particularly the United States, I am going to assume that he might take a decision to support such a terrorist attack [as occurred in '96 in the Tokyo subway]. Why, and in particular when, is not fathomable. But let's play out a scenario.

"A hit squad from somewhere in the Middle East travels to New York City carrying a one-liter bottle filled with one of the several chemical weapons agents we have long known Saddam Hussein to be developing. Using a simple sprayer (like one that a gardener or house painter might own), they diffuse the contents into the air over Times Square on a Saturday night or into the main concourse at Grand Central Station at 5:30 pm on a weekday evening. Hundreds, maybe thousands of people die agonizing deaths as a result. Because of their own handling of the substance and the strategic concern to maintain ambiguity over the source of the attack, the terrorists may have to be prepared to die themselves. “ [pp. xix – xx; emphasis added]