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Euthyphro and International Law
There's no dearth of talk lately about International Law. The latest discussion concerns the "legal" character of Israel's assassination of Sheikh Yassin of The Hamas.
Some, axiomatically, treat International Law as a kind of Holy Writ; to contravene its edicts merits the strongest censure.
I myself am skeptical about "International Law" - both that the expression signifies something unambiguous and unproblematic, and to the extent that it doesn't, that its ontological status (i.e., normative character) is at all clear.
If I had the chance, I would be glad to ask one of the enthusiasts for International Law - say, Richard Falk, who has written thoughtful pieces in The Nation - how International Law fares with the "Euthyphro Test." The latter expression comes from the English philosopher Antony Flew, who abstracted and put to general philosophical use a question from one of Plato's dialogues, the title and central character of which is Euthyphro.
If you've read the dialogue, you'll recall a pivotal question which Socrates puts to Euthyphro, who claims to be acting in accordance with the spirit of "piety" by pressing a charge of murder against his own father, the latter having (at least indirectly) contributed to the death of a hireling.
"Is what is holy holy because the gods approve of it, or do they approve of it because it is holy?" (10).
Similarly as regards International law, it would be good to know, "Is what International Law condemns bad (= to be avoided) because it condemns it, or does it condemn it because it is bad?"
March 22, 2004 | Permalink
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Comments
Paul, I'm not sure I understand your test -- or at least how it applies especially to International Law, rather than to all laws.
When Gerald Ford banned the assassination of foreign leaders, it doesn't strike me that the question to which this law was a response was: is it absolutely bad to assassinate foreign leaders. Rather, there was a series of more practical questions of governance: how, in a democracy, can assassination be countenanced as a tool of foreign policy IF it involves such secrecy as to make it impossible to supervise. In other words, the Republic was the touchstone for the law -- who will guard the guardians?
Another question, more pertinent to the Israeli case, is the vendetta question: if we don't ban assassinating foreign leaders, can our leaders then be murdered? Hamas has announced that they are going to assassinate Sharon. They might not succeed, but at some future point, the murder of an Israeli official is going to happen partly because of this assassination. While an immediate feel good policy might go over well with a population that is bitterly tired of the suicide bombings, does this policy really do anything, in the long run, to make Israel safer? I'd say no. I have the peculiar idea, actually, that Israel would be safer if there was a transnational judicial system in place there -- a court system that could judge both Palestinian and Israeli cases. Having no impartial system in place, the result is that vendetta is the rule. Putting aside morality for a moment, and using prudence as our guide, one only has to look at the population figures to see that Israel can't bet on vendetta being the rule and secure its future. It has to make another bet.
Posted by: roger at Mar 24, 2004 10:18:37 AM
Roger,
Thanks very much for commenting.
Agreed that the question could be raised about any laws. Why focus on Itl. Law with the Euthyphro test?
It is an object of greater piety than local/regional/national laws are. By "piety" I mean treating something uncritically as an object of veneration. In practice, the pious attitude is exhibited in a twofold sense: towards both the individual "laws" themselves and the philosophy of law (worldview, even) out of which they flow. The two collapse into one in the common spectacle of someone judging something as bad because it's condemned by Itl. law, rather than inquiring as to whether the condemnation is justified, and/or whether the considerations which gave rise to the codification still apply. To raise the latter questions, many a can of worms will be opened, regarding the origin, function, purposes, and limits of Itl. Law - its why's and wherefore's. The strength and appeal of Itl. law mostly come from the sense of it being a "given" framework.
With local laws, because they're "closer" to us, we're more keenly aware of them being ill-advised, outmoded, or downright unjust (or the opposites), and they consequently are more dynamic and responsive; the experience of genuine citizenship makes us alive to them in a way that we scarely can be towards Itl. Law. I think this argues for the conclusion of the formidable Leftist, Perry Anderson - there is no "International Community." Put another way, in modern Western society, the confusion(s) for which the Euthyphro test is an effective antidote aren't especially evident in the intra-national context.
Hence, I'm claiming, not just historically, but attitudinally, Itl. Law and adherence thereto evince a strain of Kantianism - the rule qua rule is to be honored, period. The ends it serves (or doesn't) recede to the background.
If, as surely we must, we choose the second horn of the dilemma the Euthyphro test proposes, then we can question whether the alleged evil proscribed by Itl. Law really is an evil, and if it is, the extent to which an Itl. "law" helps or hinders its prevention; the second horn points to the possible overcoming of International Law itself (as Socrates' question to Euthyphro does for sacred piety). Hence inquiry is awakened by looking to the foundations, and both ends and means are brought into clearer focus. Surely we can do with more of that in the current geo-political context.
I'm sure you'll appreciate the expression - by my reckoning, enthusiasm for Itl. Law needs to be awakened from its dogmatic slumber!
I'm heartened that you implicitly introduced a very important distinction in connection with Israel's actions: principle vs. prudence. In my view, Israel unquestionably "had the right" - i.e., had principle on its side - to fulfill the Sheikh's ardent wish for martyrdom. Whether it was wise to do so - prudent - is another question, as you've pointed out. I'm not sure, though I think it's defensible; especially in wanting to leave Gaza on a note of relative strength, remove one of the heads of a malevolent Hydra (and hopefully severe the collective carotid artery), and thereby embolden whatever moderates might still be there to push over a teetering Jihadist Leviathan.
As for your question about vendetta: sure, The Hamas "can" try to kill Sharon, as they and Israel are in a de facto state of war. Even though I blame shortsighted and ill-conceived Israeli policies for contributing to the radicalization of the Palestinians, my sympathies in this particular are with Israel - both the ends and the means of The Hamas are unjust. Hence I "understand" why they would want to kill Sharon, but I would emphatically deny that they have just cause.
Finally, I would question your conflation of a "transnational judicial system" with an "impartial system." The former at best could only be a necessary condition for the latter.
Paul
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Mar 24, 2004 4:01:31 PM
The answer is in the dialogue. "The good," has no objective existence. It is subjective, in that, absent human minds, it does not exist. We are aware of "the good" only because being aware of it has helped us to survive.
Posted by: Helian at Mar 24, 2004 7:12:50 PM
Helian,
Thanks for your comment.
I'm curious: what sections of the dialogue inform that reading? Please supply margin numbers.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Mar 28, 2004 7:39:54 PM