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Private & Public, Observer & Observed
Part of my appreciation of the private sector - the domain of initiative and accountability - isn't that it's at all Edenic, but rather that it is animated by a set of incentives and "aversions" which entail a greater measure of self-regulation than the public sector.
Hence it's not surprising to me that - ex hypothesi - the occupation of Iraq has evinced "poor planning," "mis-management," &c. I would hardly expect more from a vast bureaucracy - the military, Depts. of State and Defense, &c. - undertaking a fool's errand. A charitable onlooker, anyhow, has to acknowledge the role that chance and the irreducible human factor play in any attempt to resuscitate a gasping populace, strangled by decades of tyranny.
Though I'm willing to acknowledge that there certainly have been better-run occupations in the past, I do incline to the view that they are viewed through a somewhat nostalgic backwards glance. Had they been scrutinized as they unfolded, via an omnipresent - and markedly hostile - media (all media afford partial vistas, anyhow), they certainly would have been viewed, and might well have turned out, different(ly).
Here the observer, in the act of observation, is surely altering the experimental datum.
May 17, 2004 | Permalink
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I don't think the media coverage had much of an effect on public opinion toward the occupation - I think it has been largely following public opinion, as opposed to leading it. Also, much of the early coverage seemed just shy of adulatory of the Bush Administration, thanks to the carefully planned and well-executed idea of using "embedded reporters". But that's really an aside - as much fun as it is to "blame the media" for everything that goes wrong, the responsibility here lies with the decision-makers.
I do agree that this occupation has been better than most. The difference, perhaps, is that the goal of occupation is usually very different - annexation, "loot and pillage", pacifying a nation (or an area thereof) from which attacks have been launched.... Rarely has the goal of an occupying force been to liberate a population living under tyranny, and even more rarely has the goal included rebuilding a war-torn nation. Add "transforming a tyranny with no democratic tradition into a progressive democracy" and we're unquestionably treading new ground.
Can observation affect results? Yes - certainly. Whether at the level of the "scientific experiment", the bureaucracy, or under quantum theory. It has long been accepted that bureaucracies tend to be more efficient when they are not encumbered by "checks and balances" and public accountability. It is possible that, with a complete information blackout, the occupation of Iraq would be 'going better' in one sense or another - but we wouldn't know. And many Americans probably wouldn't like what we found out, if we ever learned why things 'went better' under cover of secrecy.
Posted by: Aaron at May 18, 2004 5:27:11 AM
Paul, I think this defense of the pre-occupation planning would be more convincing if we had evidence that the Pentagon planners made a good faith effort to engage with people who did have knowledge of occupations -- both the State Department's planning group and the military personnel with tacit knowledge of occupations. Instead, they ignored the one and derided the other. And they made a mistake that no multi-national makes -- they refused to hedge their bets. In other words, they refused to deviate from the one scenario they had in mind, even as that scenario was seriously damaged by the realities on the ground. Case in point was Bremer's dissolution of the Iraqi army. I'm a mere pipsqueak thousands of miles from Iraq, but even I could tell that was a disastrous move. I wrote extensively about how disastrous on my blog. I don't credit myself with extraordinary insight, there -- anyone with any knowledge of previous occupations would have advised against that move.
But in order to retain the armed forces, the Americans would have had to process them, and in order to process them, they would have had to have more boots on the ground. One mistake feeds into another. And that is the most serious problem with the planning -- not that mistakes were made, but the refusal to recognize that they were made, or investigate the causes.
Posted by: roger at May 18, 2004 11:16:00 AM
Paul,
Come on, man. Jump on in. We are expecting a summa goring of such doves as moi. You did an ace job parrying my provocations over at my weblog -- but you seem to be hesitating on the brink on yours.
Posted by: roger at May 19, 2004 4:59:24 PM
The problem with taking a while to respond is that it creates the impression that one is building up
a real "gotcha" response ... and I'm afraid that isn't the case with this one. :)
I've been focusing a bit on astronomy, which has been a welcome respite from politics.
Appearances notwithstanding, I'm actually fairly "agnostic" about the (in)competence exhibited in the conduct of the occupation. I'm honestly not sure where/how to apportion credit and blame.
What I am more certain about is that there's a danger in reaching unshakeable conclusions about how things are going in/with Iraq. Events unfold too quickly, and the vistas we're offered are too partial, for an onlooker from this remove to reach more than provisional conclusions.
I disagree with Aaron about the general tenor of media coverage, since the truism seems to me, well, true that the apparently catastrophic is more sensational - hence newsworthy - than the little victories of rebuilding schools and hospitals, having newspapers crop up here and there, ratcheting up oil output, &c. And though I suspect no "conspiracy," I'm willing to hazard the guess that people working in the media tend to be Leftish (hence hostile to Bush and his "good old boys"), since journalism and its offshoots seem to attract "idealistic" people - an ethos I associate more with the Left than Right.
I think Aaron made a very good point about the occupation being easier going - and probably more "successful," ultimately - could it be prosecuted without the prying eyes of the global Fourth Estate. But for better and worse, such is not the case.
Roger, you misunderstand my aim if you would characterize it as a "defense of the pre-occupation planning ." My purpose was twofold: (1) to say "of course" mistakes have been/are being made - this is government work! (2) Attenuate whatever criticism is due by noting the Herculean-Sisyphean nature of the task - yes, criticize, but do so with a sensitivity to the great challenges and limitations of the situation. (2a) Note the enormous causal factor of our media-riddled culture.
The way you phrased your critique, you seem to equate the lack of evidence of planning with evidence that planning was lacking - a conclusion that doesn't follow. This is reminiscent of the kind of thing we've locked horns over frequently - I'm always asking about the basis for the view that no planning was done. I may misunderstand your argument, but you seem to be asserting, "because such-and-such was done, which is palpably stupid, there clearly wasn't planning." But that's just as compatible with flawed planning, as no planning; persons with know-how from previous, successful occupations might have been consulted, and their counsel was taken for what it was believed to be worth. Do we know - really know - that no consultations were undertaken, sifted, and collated?
As to the dissolution of the army, to the extent that such arguably flowed out of a serious attempt at de-Ba'athification, I certainly don't think it's beyond the pale; perhaps a legitimate kernel of insight was over-amplified ("good enough for government work"[!]).
And since Bremer himself said that it was a mistake to "de-Ba'athify" in the way it was done, I raise an eyebrow at your assertion regarding "the refusal to recognize that they were made, or investigate the causes." Au contraire, I think this occupation has appeared to be quite ad hoc and mutable, in response to a variety of factors - some meriting a change of course, others perhaps being bumps in the road that ought to have been ridden over.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at May 19, 2004 10:00:19 PM
Paul, I think it was Aristotle (in his popular "Ask Aristotle" advice column) who said that astronomy was for the noble mind, and politics for the vulgar one. Of course, this was the same Aristotle who told Alexander the Great that there was a gathering threat on the Persian horizon...
Anyway, a few remarks.
1. I don't think that there was no planning for the occupation - I think there was bad planning.
2. The criteria for deciding whether an organizational project has been well planned or conducted should be separated from the politics of its goals. In the case of the Pentagon's Iraq plans, we have a pretty good idea, I think, of where the problems stem from. The two overriding mistakes are lack of resources and an inability to compare scenarios given various inflection points.
3. The primo example is the de-ba'athification. Let's leave aside, for the moment, whether dissolving the army was a good or bad idea. It was the idea that the CPA wanted to implement. Fine. Here is where you pay attention to the military guys -- and the state department guys. Since WWII, there are certain things that, as Rumsfeld might say, are the "knowns." In Germany, and Japan, the soldiery was first processed through POW camps. The good reason for doing so is that it allows the occupying power to control the largest source of potential aggression in the country.
4. But it wasn't done. Why? Because it couldn't be done. Because the resources weren't there to do it. Rumsfeld's insistence on an occupation-lite, much like Ken Lay's insistence on Enron being an assetless corporation, sounded good on paper -- and there was a little bubble for it among the rightwing think tanks -- but it fell to pieces faced with reality.
5. Should they have know it would fall to pieces? Was this an unprecedented situation?
Yes they should have. No it wasn't.
6. A bad plan, in a large organization, bears certain hallmarks. The one that was obviously operating in 2002 and 2003 was what you might call the faith based fallacy. This fallacy says that, in spite of past histories, a project will succeed because we believe it will succeed.
7. There is a rational root to this belief. If skepticism achieves a critical mass, it can cripple a project. But if the leadership decides to enforce gullibility, the project is stripped of those adaptive features that can lead to (compromised) success. I'd say we have a pretty good case of that here.
Now, onto the stars. Do you go to the blogs on Corante? They are my fave science blogs.
Posted by: roger at May 20, 2004 3:59:54 PM
You articulate my own position with some precision. I'd excerpt the following as being particularly apropos:
Emphasis upon a reasonable or "charitable" observer, where reasonable would include a skepticism toward overly positive conclusions, whether pro or con concerning the occupation and prospects for a successful resolution and turnover. Factoring in "chance" and the "irreducible human factor," also the simple and open acknowledgement of the effects of "decades of tyranny," all that rings true at very basic, very elemental levels. The tentativeness or hesitancy (agnosticism) when it comes to "apportioning blame," that too rings true at primary or elemental levels.
And the following summary, quoted more fully:
"(2) Attenuate whatever criticism is due by noting the Herculean-Sisyphean nature of the task - yes, criticize, but do so with a sensitivity to the great challenges and limitations of the situation. (2a) Note the enormous causal factor of our media-riddled culture."
Undue and unsupported over-reach is avoided while the viability of an evenly tempered skepticism and critique directed toward all the multivaried, multi-interested parties is more positively asserted as well. Reminiscent of the bumper sticker that says "Question Authority, Including Your Own." Or perhaps summarized as: "What can we know and when can we know it?"
Posted by: Michael B at May 23, 2004 4:49:50 PM