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There is no signpost in ...
It's one thing to acknowledge that Iraq is in a parlous state at the moment.
It's another to treat any of the observable magnitudes as vectors - as if we now know what the ultimate outcome will likely be. In this connection, Victor Davis Hanson provides some interesting historical sweep:
"It is always difficult for those involved to determine the pulse of any ongoing war. The last 90 days in the Pacific theater were among the most costly of World War II, as we incurred 50,000 casualties on Okinawa just weeks before the Japanese collapse. December 1944 and January 1945 were the worst months for the American army in Europe, bled white repelling Hitler's last gasp in the Battle of the Bulge. Contemporaries shuddered, after observing those killing fields, that the war would go on for years more. The summer of 1864 convinced many that Grant and Lincoln were losers, and that McClellan alone could end the conflict by what would amount to a negotiated surrender of Northern war aims."
I have my hopes, of course, but I haven't a clue as to how things will turn out with/for Iraq - and I'm skeptical of those who offer more than provisional judgments.
September 17, 2004 | Permalink
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This war retains its precarious popularity only to the extent that it is conducted frivolously, which is why Bush is the perfect person to wage it. [Read More]
Tracked on Sep 23, 2004 11:34:23 AM
Comments
I think you're right on this, Paul. And what follows is not just that we should withhold non-provisional judgements, but also that we should support whatever actions are needed to increase the likelihood of a good outcome.
Posted by: Eve Garrard at Sep 18, 2004 2:59:20 AM
I disagree with the thesis that "It is always difficult for those involved to determine the pulse of any ongoing war". What a remarkable generalization, supported only by additional generalizations about the tail-ends of two of history's thousands of wars. Wouldn't "sometimes" have been a more appropriate word choice? Perhaps even "at times"?
Certainly, nobody can pretend to see the future. Sometimes the winds shift unexpectedly in a favorable direction. But it nonetheless remains possible to tell which way the wind is blowing, and that still remains the best predictor of what will follow. Statements from the Ministry of Information aside, do you think Saddam Hussein couldn't tell how his two Bush wars were going to turn out?
I don't think it is unreasonable to expect a better explanation from our nation's leaders as to how they will turn the situation around than, "Things have been really ugly in prior wars, which nonetheless worked out our way." Yet we don't even get that - we get rhetoric about not "looking weak", or "staying the course".
Additionally, we aren't presently looking at a classic war situation in Iraq, be it storming Okinawa or the conclusion of the Civil War - Hanson's analogy isn't even apt. We are looking at an occupation and insurgency (or whatever term you prefer). Is there a historical precedent Mr. Hanson can point us to where a bloody insurgency against an occupying power transformed itself into the type of love-fest we were promised when Bush launched this war?
Is this essay an excuse to disregard the recent intelligence information on the most likely outcomes in Iraq? Or is it meant as an argument that we should ignore the similarly bleak prognostications from the commanders in the field? Once we rule out looking at all available evidence, what would the author have us look to for guidance as to a probable future? Wishful thinking?
Posted by: Aaron at Sep 18, 2004 7:15:50 AM
Eve,
Thanks for the words of support. From reading your essays at Normblog, I take it that you meant "whatever actions are needed" to be qualified as requiring that proportionality be observed in the means employed, consonant with some kind of defensible rules of engagement.
Aaron,
I'm not sure why you're bothered by the expression "It is always difficult" - a far cry from "it is nearly (or always) impossible." I'd draw a parallel to an individual's sense - say, a captain of industry - of the state of the macro-economy. Owing to an inherent limitation of horizon, one could know one's own business, to be sure, perhaps even one's industry quite well, but be on much weaker footing speaking advisedly about The Market. (Similary, field commanders will know their battles better than the general drift of things). And even those whose business it is to take a God's-eye view of the economy - collating reams of individual data - have trouble reading the signs of the times.
The point of Hanson's analogy, as I read it, is that victory can - and did - come even though antecedent events might not have led one to expect it. In those terms, I don't think it matters much that the belligerents in the one case were engaged in more traditional "symmetrical" battle - troop-to-troop - and the current case is an occupying power vs. an insurgency. We're still talking about a highly fluid and confusing situation where the variables are constantly transmuting, with contingency and indeterminacy ruling the day; the "fog of war" indeed.
As to Hanson's essay being an "excuse," I'm not sure if you meant what he intended in writing it, or my intention in citing it. I certainly take that Intelligence Estimate (vs. "information") seriously - but if recent events have taught us anything, surely it's that Intelligence professionals are fallible, and have their own agendae besides (as does everyone). If I were speaking to a spook, I'd state the same points that I'm proposing here - they strike me as flowing out of fundamental espistemological considerations about the limits of prediction within a chaotic milieu.
And there was really no rational excuse for Saddam not knowing, a priori, that his defeat was in the cards - assessing weaponry, firepower, resources, etc. would have shown that his demise was a good bet. By contrast, the character, extent, and durability of an insurgency was much more indeterminate from the start.
Again, I have no idea how things will turn out. I agree things look grim now, and they may decay from bad to worse - but they can turn around, and not just owing to a "miracle." And, as I've said here before, as citizens our own perceptions of the state of things can influence the outcome, arguing perhaps for an openness to a positive turnaround.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Sep 19, 2004 10:29:08 PM
In a "macro" sense, it is usually not difficult to anticipate the composition of this year's Fortune 500 by looking at the prior year's list, or even the list from a decade before. Similarly, most investors anticipate that they will benefit from long-term investment in a manner consistent with market history, despite any short-term market volatility. Yes, it is difficult for even the most seasoned professional to try to "time the market", the overall trends and historical patterns are accessable to laypersons. And the unlikely can occur - for example, it may well be that some of the "doomsday" predictions about the stock market and the U.S. economy will turn out to be true and that the stock market will collapse. But available evidence suggests that such an outcome is unlikely.
In the sense of the commander in the field, at least within the context of modern warfare (and even more in the "information age" U.S. warfare of recent decades), I think history also demonstrates that field commanders often have both a very good sense of whether they are likley to win a particular battle, and also whether a victory in that battle will be meaningful in the sense of the war as a whole.
We apparenntly have different interpretations of the Hanson piece. I see Hanson's intention as to distract the reader from unpleasant realities, and to suggest that because we cannot predict the future with certainty we should ignore the best evidence of what the future is likely to be. From my perspective, his "historical sweep" seems to involve sweeping the best evidence and best historical analogies under the carpet. Further, I see him as coupling that suggestion that if you don't ignore those realities, the only path left open is that of premature withdrawal. Obviously, it is possible to be a realist and still work for the best possible outcome - arguably, realists have the best chance of achieving the best possible outcome because their perceptions are based upon facts, not wishful thinking.
I am certainly willing to accept - and willing to extend hope - that the original stated goal of the Iraq endeavor will be achieved, and that at the conclusion of the present mess Iraq will be blessed with a stable, progressive, democratic government. But I cannot disregard the facts, the present pessimism of both the military and political leaders responsible for the present state of affairs, the historical evidence from prior military occupations, and the consensus of the world's intelligence agencies, so as to view that outcome as likely.
Which of our nation's political leaders presently predicts the "stable, progressive democracy" for Iraq? The present goals seem to be first stability, secondarily some form of at least nominal democracy, and third the hope that there won't be a bloodbath in the event that we reduce our military presence.
Whatever the benefit of public optimism, it seems to me that our nation's leaders are creating the increasing public perception that our goals as originally stated are futile, and that we should be happy with pretty much any exit strategy that does not result in an Iraqi civil war. Perhaps a nation of pollyannas would effectively force its political leaders to work harder at achieving a better outcome, so as not to crush the hopes of the voting public. (I don't personally believe that politicians would indefinitely lock us into an unwinnable war, merely because the public remained optimistic about an outcome they viewed as unattainable, but public perceptions can influence more ambiguous political decisions.) But it seems to me that (despite its criticism of "negative" press coverage) the Bush Administration is deliberately diminishing public expectations, and there is little question but that the Administration's "candy and flowers" rhetoric is a relic of the past.
On a final note, as if I haven't carried on long enough, I was speaking about Iraq with a friend of mine, a military veteran who endorses a "victory with honor" resolution (essentially the one Hanson describes as "to re-declare 'Mission Accomplished' — and then quietly leave"), who points out an additional lesson from history. The mere fact that we create a democratic regime, or pick a good initial leader, does not mean either that the leader will turn out to have been a good choice or that the people will rally behind democracy. (He likes to point to Algeria, where the people voted to replace democracy with theocracy, and where democracy was "saved" only by the intervention of the military.) To some degree, no matter what we do or how hard we hope, and no matter what we actually achieve, the final outcome remains unpredictable.
Posted by: Aaron at Sep 20, 2004 10:35:48 AM
'From my perspective, his "historical sweep" seems to involve sweeping the best evidence and best historical analogies under the carpet.'
Good line.
What were we arguing about, anyway?!
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Sep 20, 2004 11:43:42 AM
Wasn't it about lunch? I swear, Paul, it is your turn to pick up the lunch tab.
Posted by: Aaron at Sep 20, 2004 12:57:46 PM