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Rational Redoubts
Why don't discussants make much progress in debate, as occasioned by conversation, blogging or whatnot?
Our confrontations, about this or that, reflect deeper antecedent disagreements. We're less likely to concede a matter if to do so seems to overturn a cornerstone of our worldview.
My advocacy of social security privatization rests on my distrust of the state, and relative confidence in the market and its incentives; your opposition thereto rests on a distrust of the market, and relative confidence in the state and its incentives. Or: we differ as to what is the "just" distribution of costs and risk - who should bear them, and why. This one apparently "compact" question is pregnant with a panoply of assumptions in regards to political philosophy, economics, history, and human nature - a worldview in miniature.
I was for the invasion of Iraq, you were against it. We differ over: the normative status/character of the United Nations and International Law; the sense(s) in which Iraq was relevant to 9.11; the best use of finite military resources (money and manpower) and/or the priorities we ought to have, to best serve our security, and other important values; the moral hue of the modern ("capitalistic") nation-state, the personal character of our leaders, their trustworthiness; etc.
Differences which evidently entail a religious commitment (or its lack) are almost too obvious to mention.
It seems as if progress is made when/if one of the disputants comes to realize that his principles can, or ought to, entail the initially opposing view, so that a principle is, in effect, strengthened by embracing a newly discovered consequent.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, I believe that one of my own core beliefs is exemplified and fortified by these reflections: even though persuasion is the fittingly humane instrument to realize social cohesion, "rational" discourse - especially in an age, ironically enough, where "everyone is Aristotle" - has a surprisingly limited efficacy, at least with respect to normative matters (properly scientific questions, which can more easily be resolved according to accepted procedures, are a different matter). Hence we cannot do without rhetoric, including "myth," and, alas, coercion; not now, or, I expect, ever.
The "libertarian" hope is that, by narrowly circumscribing the controversies in terms of which the private is made public (viz., is subject to legislation), the agreement to disagree in civil fashion can be afforded the widest scope. But this ideal is quite vulnerable to attacks on its Left and Right flanks, since such a "thin" view of social life isn't likely to command the civic spirit required to sustain it for any length of time. Hence libertarianism degenerates into apparent libertinism and indifference (or seems little more inspiring than "a nation of shopkeepers"), which provokes a cultural counter-reaction.
February 27, 2005 | Permalink
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"It seems as if progress is made when/if one of the disputants comes to realize that his principles can, or ought to, entail the initially opposing view, so that a principle is, in effect, strengthened by embracing a newly discovered consequent."
By "entail the initially opposing view", do you mean "explain why the opponent holds the (mistaken) view that she does?" If so, I see what you mean and tend to agree; if not, I'm not sure I understand what you're talking about.
Posted by: alan at Mar 2, 2005 5:45:17 AM
Alan,
Thanks for commenting.
I see what you mean - that sentence wasn't very clear.
My over-arching idea in the post was tying the notion of "cost" - having to give something up - to beliefs; how it might be felt too costly to abjure a view, if the view was held to be a consequent of an anterior worldview.
The "form" would go like this:
if my worldview x, then consequent view y; y is what you and I are debating; if you show y to be mistaken, then so is worldview x (modus tollens).
In the offending sentence, what I was trying to say was that progress might be made in such a debate if you established y, but I came to believe that in fact there was no entailment of y from my worldview x after all (no necessary connection). So, my worldview stands, and in a way is "strengthened" - since I now realize that the disputation wasn't really calling it into question in the way that I'd imagined, and (thus) perhaps it's not as "narrow" a view as I'd imagined.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Mar 2, 2005 11:46:10 AM
Paul, the interesting thing about your point, to me, is that it seems to present the idea that the great disputes always come down to a binary. So, for instance, to oppose privatizing social security means distrusting the market, and supporting it means distrusting the government.
But this rule seems wrong to me. I, for instance, think the risk in the market and the function of social security combine to make it better for s.s. to remain as it is -- but I also think one of the consequences of social security is to allow more people to engage part of their wealth or their activities in riskier, entrepreneurial ways. Now, you might disagree with that, but to say that it reflects my preference for the state and distrust of the market is what I would take to be a distortion.
In other words, while it is true that people who reflect often come at the world in ways to make their views cohere, it isn't clear, therefore, what their actual views will be in every case. In many cases, a worldview is composed by prioritizing as well as coherence -- so, for instance, a conservative who believes in markets might still believe in banning marijuana.
This is why argument and discussion, while seeming at the moment to end up in stalemates, often, in a longer timeline, show unexpected agreements and disagreements. You, for instance, with your distrust of the state, which I would imagine comes from some Hayekian belief that central planning will fail, still believe that the U.S. can centrally plan a democracy in Iraq. You might try to get around this as a special instance, but -- given that central plannings failure is peculiarly due to the information possessed by the people within an organization that can't be understood by those -- state bureaucrats -- outside of an organization -- I would have to say that your world view would tend to make you a libertarian dissenter to the war. But I think you support it because of priorities that create a different set of rules.
Posted by: roger at Mar 2, 2005 9:17:57 PM
Roger,
Good pts. I didn't mean to insinuate that the "binary" alternative is what a dispute comes down to; but my thought was that a clear difference (antipodes) helps to illustrate my overall point - competing "cherished beliefs" - most vividly and dramatically.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Mar 4, 2005 4:05:23 PM