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The metaphysics of analogies
My friend and good-natured foil, Roger Gathman, has overplayed his rhetorical hand in a recent post, "War Crimes Alert."
(First, my usual exhortation: read the original piece, to make sure I've read him accurately/fairly. And read it anyway, because Roger is a great writer and has a powerful mind).
The burden of the piece seems to be that the U.S. has been systematically indiscriminate in the means of warfare it has employed throughout the occupation of Iraq, particularly in Falluja - the levelling of which is now gleefully planned for other insurgent holdouts, like Ramadi. The tacit conclusion (implication) seems to be that the entire enterprise is morally bankrupt. Far from being the point established by the piece, however, I believe that this view is actually Roger's point of departure - petitio principii.
He ends with the zinger: "So, in the hall of shame, where the Sand Creek massacre stands next to My Lae and Falluja, we will soon be inscribe the name Ramadi."
These alleged analogies are instructive: why not the firebombing of German and Japanese cities in WWII; or a case nearly sui generis, like Hiroshima or Nagasaki? If ever one wanted paradigmatic modern instances of the "good guys" targetting non-combatants intentionally, these would be the ones.
Here's where, I think, Roger's piece is itself paradigmatic: the case of WWII is usually ignored because it's morally ambiguous. One - or a sane one - is certainly glad that the U.S. and its allies prevailed, despite the "war crimes" committed along the way (and alas there are numerous other instances of, speaking charitably, morally dubious allied conduct). I certainly am troubled - deeply - by these actions, but I can make a kind of "sense" out of them by adverting to a principle of the tragic view: clashes and conflicts on the world stage are usually a meeting of wrong with greater wrong, so that the former becomes, relatively speaking, "right."
Now, one might admit that the terror bombing in the Second World War was indefensible absolutely speaking, but that the desperation of the times - what was at stake - mitigates the blame; i.e., makes such conduct, to some extent, forgivable. And, judged according to the same standard, the "adventure" in Iraq is not analogous. Two things can be said about this reasonable gambit: a whole host of assumptions is made about the overall significance of the longstanding conflict with Iraq, and the "meta-intentions" of the invaders(petitio principii again?); and this is still to face up to the moral enormity of allied actions in the cases cited - they might be "forgivable," but they must be acknowledged as glaring instances of intentionally harming noncombatants (and hence still belong in a "hall of shame" [ed. "hall of tragedy"?]).
By contrast, since we all "know" that the treatment of native Americans, the aims and conduct of war in Vietnam, and now, Falluja, were unqualifiedly diabolical, they serve as perfect Manichean touchstones to indict current American actions under difficult conditions, where every option is morally and strategically risky. In other words, if you already believe that Iraq is analogous to past military outrages, then you'll have a keen eye for "war crimes." If you do not, you might be of the view that even putative misdeeds in warfare are not the whole story when it comes to hazarding an overall evaluation.
February 22, 2005 | Permalink
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Comments
Paul,
I intentionally exaggerated on the the post -- and you do pin me on that -- since (in all honesty) -- I don't think the U.S. can afford to do to Ramadi what it did to Falluja. However, to alert readers about signs of a campaign is to alert readers to spread the news -- which might exert the kind of pressure that would prevent the U.S. military from pursuing the extremist policy.
The analogies I chose are given structurally. There's no enemy of the state organized kind, as in WWII -- rather, this is a stochastic war, as was Vietnam and the Plains Indian wars. It is part of the horror of Falluja, to my mind, that the very premise -- that there is a big HQ that is grinding out the insurgency -- is horribly wrong. As was the similar military hallucination that there was some huge underground headquarters for the war in S. Vietnam just over the border in Cambodia.
Since, however, the military can never make mistakes, they are now trying out a second story -- there was a huge HQ in Falluja, but somehow all the main people escaped from Falluja. This, of course, is pure covering-my-assism. The increase in violence after Falluja was predictable -- I predicted it -- because the violence is organized by means of a network, instead of a hub. Think of the way airports are organized in the U.S. -- there are hubs you have to go through, like Chicago and Atlanta, but you could knock out both of those and still make it from New York to St. Louis or to S.F. The insurgent organization, unsurprisingly, is like that.
Posted by: roger at Feb 22, 2005 1:14:44 PM
Roger,
I will look forward to the historical consensus which will emerge a couple decades hence, as to the dynamics of the insurgency, and what the exact distribution points of it will be ajudged to have been. History may bear you out. Or not.
I agree that the military - as a branch of the state - is loathe to acknowledge mistakes, though an earlier stubbornness to do so may have been supplanted (or complemented) by the conviction that, with a hostile press and commentariat, it's too costly politically to do so.
It may gall you, but perhaps it won't surprise you to know that to me it's an open question whether a "war crime" was even committed in Falluja; my intuition is that they probably shaved it pretty close. My overall point of asking about (what I saw as) the telling omission of WWII analogues was that the far greater allied atrocities weren't of great enough moment to render the victory over the Axis powers "morally bankrupt." You seem to suggest: U.S. conduct in the occupation of Iraq has entailed War Crimes - end of story. I say: not so fast.
I notice that those leading the charge of war crimes are mostly the people who have been saying that the whole enterprise - the invasion - was/is a colossal mistake. Either their role in the opposition gives them an objectivity which the advocates of invasion lack; or it's more sour grapes. Or Neither. But it's tough to dis-entangle the prior allegiances of the interlocutors (and I certainly include myself in that generalization). One step towards doing that is to be clear as to exactly what is - and isn't - proven by allegations of war crimes, and misconduct generally.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Feb 22, 2005 4:42:55 PM
Paul, first I should say -- a friend pointed out that the fabulous rodent who is supposed to be inserted in a fabulous orifice is a gerbil, not a guinea pig, as I had it in my post. Oops. A little problem with scale, there.
Second, I think your point actually works insofar as the analogy is sloppy with Plain Indian warfare. But the WWII analogy, to my mind, is misleading.
Hmm, the reason I think it is misleading is long enough that I think I'm gonna make a post out of it. Tomorrow. Tonight, I am drinking vodka, in honor of the memory of Hunter S. Thompson, so I am sort of a logical casualty. Or casualty of logic. Or doing logic casually. As you can see, the arms are sweeping around, endangering the china!
Posted by: roger at Feb 22, 2005 4:52:06 PM
I guess it would be easier for me to gauge the degree to which the tactics applied in Iraq, however described, will color the victory, if I knew what we will gain by virtue of the victory - assuming, that is, we achieve an actual victory. I think that a fair case can be made that the tactics in Iraq, including Fallujah, move us away from victory. At least in the "war on terror", which (I think) is supposed to be our reason for the whole enterprise.
What will we gain at the end of the day if, as it appears, we manage to install an oil-rich Shiite quasi-democracy to replace a Sunni dictatorship? And what level of harm to civilians should we excuse before our tactics color that victory? (Do I really have to wait twenty or so years, for a historical consensus, before those questions can be answered?)
Posted by: Aaron at Feb 22, 2005 8:06:59 PM
Roger,
I look forward to the next installment.
Aaron,
Some good/fair questions.
Firstly, to correct a misunderstanding: I didn't mean to say that we'd wait 20-odd years to be able to answer the kinds of questions you posed - though ultimately "history" will pass its judgments, of course - but rather that future historians will likely have a far better grasp of the actual structure of the insurgency, and the extent to which actions such as the retaking of Fallujah were really predicated on a sound grasp of the character of the insurgency.
I think I can fold a couple of your challenges into one, and answer them overall by saying that the main goal politically is to make room - at the point of a gun - for political moderation in the Muslim (espec. Arab) Middle East, and hope thereby to attain critical mass for reform in the direction of constitutional democracy throughout the region. (The animating view - which I share - is that the basic "root causes" of terrorism, over the long haul, are the Middle-Eastern political Scylla and Charybdis of either Stalinist Secularism or Tribal-Kingly-Theocracy/Kleptocracy).
If some kind of authentic "freedom" is to be attained, it will happen over the long(er) term, which is perfectly consistent with a situation which sees shorter-term difficulties and setbacks ("recruiting terrorists"); if the goal is realized, it will like entail lurching three steps forward, and two back. I'd analogize this to a risky surgery in which the patient will get worse before he gets better. Since the status quo clearly didn't "work," and we have greater room to maneuver now since we don't have the burden of trying to prevent the sovietization of the region, for my money this is the best - though still risky - bet.
I was - and still, in my heart of hearts, am - attracted to just quitting the good 'ol Middle East, and "leaving them to it." But no one ought to contemplate that move lightly.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Feb 22, 2005 9:34:19 PM
It was not really a misunderstanding, Paul - I was being dramatic. ;-)
Yes, I'm aware of the speculation that, despite its ever-changing publicly stated reasons for going to war in Iraq, the Bush Administration bought into a dream that it could knock down the Iraqi government, install something more democratic in its place, and that democracy would ripple through the region. Not that Bush is particularly concerned about having nations led by thugs, dictators, and kings - after all some of his best friends seem to be thugs, dictators, and kings. He doesn't seem particularly concerned with bringing democracy to, say, Pakistan, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia. But hey - if you're going to reform a region, why start with your friends?
So far, despite "mission accomplished" banners, significant military offensives against "militant strongholds", detention without charge or trial (with, oh, let's call it some abuse of prisoners), and other similar progressive measures, while I'm familiar with the two steps back to which you allude I'm not seeing much forward momentum. Now, granted, I'm willing to wait and see if the Iraqi elections and subsequent constitutional convention can turn that around. But if this is the first leg in a marathon effort to "democratize" the Middle East, we've stumbled more than a bit at the starting blocks.
I would have started with a Middle East initiative that was a bit different than Bush's, and would have been initially focused on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the newish King of Jordan and the newish dictator of Syria. I would have pressed for economic changes and improvements, progress on relations with Israel (and with the resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict), and pressed for changes which, although baby steps toward democracy, would have started to create the fundamental institutions required for functioning democracy in that region. And the progress made within that region would have been the model I would hope would demonstrate how the Middle East could modernize, improve life for its people, work with American, and even work with Israel, without compromising its fundamental values or culture. Granted, I can understand to some degree how some would think that invading Iraq would be more likely to lead to progress, but so far the evidence seems to weigh against that as the best bet. But that's the one Bush chose and, as they say, you can't unroll the dice.
Posted by: Aaron at Feb 23, 2005 1:21:56 PM
Aaron,
My apologies for the slipshod grammar in my previous reply - I gotta watch the mixing of wine and blogging.
Starting with our "friends" would get us where it has always got us - exactly nowhere. Or rather, somewhere: the fragile status quo, to which I adverted, and which we must overcome. The regimes you single out for scorn certainly fit into my "Scylla and Charybdis" schema - if, for the time being, we can count on them to maintain a frosty peace with Israel, provide intelligence on Al Qaeda, and liberalize a bit here and there, I think that's an achievement. The boldness of the current strategy is that it attempts to do an end run around the status quo - to sweep away current allies ultimately in a region-wide ferment for liberal reform.
The choice of Iraq is obvious to me as the lab-experiment for liberalization-at-gunpoint. We had ample reason to end our decade-plus war with Saddam - verify his true disarmament status, prevent/disrupt any collusion with terrorists, move the troops out of Saudi, end sanctions. Plus, Iraq's oil wealth makes it a great candidate for encouraging the emergence of a bourgeois "investor-class," instead of the usual kleptocracy.
It's a cheap shot to lambast Bush for being "friends" with dictators and thugs - unless you're willing to level that charge against every previous modern administration (say, post WWI). Your fella, J.F. Kerry, would have had to do a certain amount of genuflecting to the baddies of the world, had he been crowned king (in fact, such was a plank of his doomed campaign, viz., wanting to "reconcile" with the baddies/thugs of the UN!). It just comes with the territory of "engaging" the world - hence the attractiveness, to me, of isolationism.
I'm puzzled as to why you say that the administration's case for war was "ever-changing." There was a systematic case, and different facets thereof were emphasized at different times. But I invite you to produce any mutually contradictory reasons which were adduced (or even non-complementary ones) - I'm honestly not aware of any. It's just smart for one's rhetoric to adjust to one's audience; and, in any event, nearly every reason which was profferred in the run-up to the invasion can be found in the NSS Document of September, 2002.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Feb 23, 2005 6:24:39 PM
Without our $2 billion per year, Egypt's government will collapse. And my starting group included Syria, which isn't really a friend. Yes, perhaps it would have gone nowhere. But remind me again, before Bush got his knickers in a twist and invaded Iraq, what precisely was he doing in the Middle East again? Beyond ignoring "historical" memos about how Bin Laden wanted to attack the U.S. on its own soil, that is.
Making an effort toward peaceful progress, if it fails, doesn't create a catastrophe for the region. And, while failure is frustrating, if you haven't done anything irretrievable you can pick up and start over. So it doesn't seem like a bad place to start - particularly over the Bush Administration's preferred pre-9/11 alternative of "doing nothing".
Now, Iraq may well have been a great target for "invade and engage in a wild experiment in democratization", as you have suggested. But that's a pretty wild experiment - and that is certainly not what the Bush Administration professed it was doing when it launched its invasion.
I'm perfectly happy to criticize past administrations for cuddling up to dictators and thugs, so you don't get me on that one. ;-) Sometimes it is politically necessary to be buddies with the bad guys. But if you want to go in that direction, I'm not aware that Kennedy or Clinton families, for example, regularly threw pool parties (or the equivalent) with members of the House of Saud - there seems to be a qualitative difference with Bush, and his documented long-term friendships with the Sauds, or his professed friendship with Putin.
I'm satisfied that the record bears out my assertion that the Administration's excuse for their war took the form of "the flavor of the week". It may well be that there was a list of justifications for invasion, but unless you can point to me where the President endorsed that list (or suggested that, whatever other reasons we professed, our primary purpose was to engage in an expermiment in democratization by force) rather than, as one of his aides suggested he did, picking the public reason which he thought would be the easiest to sell (then changing, and changing, and changing that reason as the facts inconveniently conflicted with his prior claims), I'm all ears.
Posted by: Aaron at Feb 24, 2005 11:40:07 AM
Paul, your overall point about American foreign policy is a good one. Bush's policy is, in many ways, simply continuous with Jimmy Carter's own inability to find his tongue when it came to abuses committed by our Middle Eastern allies, and our own misplaced idea that we have a right to be in the Persian Gulf. Actually, from what I have read, the one American who did emphasize human rights to the Saudis was JFK -- who rather liked Nasser's energy, even though we were officially against him. And the Saudis backed down -- they officially "abolished" slavery in 63, due to pressure from the Americans.
But I think you are right, Aaron, that a real policy, instead of one that is simply moral sloganeering, can't afford systematic discrepencies -- and in fact our policy does just that. A foreign policy that is successful has to be successful from two ends -- it has to also be successful through the perspective of the countries with which one is having this policy. That's a simple standard, and by that standard, Bush has been an outstanding failure, a complete disaster.
As for his axis of evil -- Iran is a much free-er society than Saudi Arabia. There's a friend of mine who runs a good blog from Teheran, the Brooding Persian. broodingpersian.blogspot.com/
You can't read him for more than a week without something scathing about the government. That just wouldn't happen with Saudi Arabia -- and I have my doubts that much criticism would be allowed in Egypt. On the other hand -- I can't say my friend's name. Iran is still controlled by an unpopular group of rich bazaaris and mullahs. This group, by the way, is very into economic liberalization -- they would be.
If we are going to be tentative, let's have detente with Iran. Let's not just confine our friendships in Pakistan exclusively to the military caste. Let's talk about the shameful persecution of Shiites in Saudi Arabia. And -- if we are going to oppose illegal nuclear weapons in Iran -- let's oppose them in Israel, too. Seems to me that this would promote democracy without hurting American interests in the Middle East.
And -- main thing -- we need a timetable for withdrawing from Iraq by the end of this year.
Posted by: roger at Feb 24, 2005 5:59:13 PM
Good grief, I'm tag-teamed now - Crustaceous Craddick vs. Rambunctious Roger and Loco Larson!
I'm dizzy from the rabbit-punches and body- blows; let's see if I can make a decisive rejoinder, or at least deliver a rhetorical kick in the groin ...
Aaron,
Here is one of, as I recall, several statements in which Shrub Bush adverted to Iraqi freedom ("democracy") as a desideratum, ahead of the invasion. I've already directed you to another outstanding exhibit, the National Security Strategy Document of September, 2002. I believe that we can stipulate that Bush "endorsed" its contents!
And, I noticed your rhetorical legerdemain - not challenging my point regarding a "systematic" case for war, but using the term "list" as if what I said amounted to (merely) that. Bah!
I see what you mean about a more modest "peace process" not leading to catastrophe, if it fails - the Intifada has been great for the Middle East, and the world! (I thought that the Israel-Palestine conflict was the most important pressing conflict globally?!). And prior American "engagement" in that Sisyphean task certainly earned the gratitude of some folks who danced with joy on September 11; or wait, I suppose that those astute tarantella-ists only did the jig because of Bush's "inaction" (he didn't come riding up and present the keys to Al Quds).
Which "Bush" are you alleging is the best bud of the House of Saud? I would expect Michael Moore to conflate the daddy and the whippersnapper, but not you ... In fact, I think Bush the younger has done more than any president in recent memory to allow us to de-couple, ultimately, from that merry band of Kleptocrats - dethroning King Saddam allowed us to move the troops out of Saudi, and one hopes that opening the Iraqi spigot will visit harm upon Saudi oil interests, and/or OPEC generally. And I bet the Saudi Royals are happy about Bush's bond with Sharon and his trial balloon about the Israelis maintaing sizeable settlement-blocs in the West Bank! (And let's not mention facilitating the ascendancy of the dreaded Shi'ites in Iraq).
Roger,
Your "paraphrase" of me is about as accurate as if I had summarized some recent remarks of yours as saying, "the welfare state sucks"! Whatever Bush's faults - and I'm certainly willing to concede them - there is hardly any resemblance between him and that milquetoast extraordinaire, Jimmy Carter, friend of Ceaucesceau (in regards to whom, Putin is a pussycat).
I see I haven't convinced you, but the upshot of my preceding remarks is that there is no such thing as a "consistent" foreign policy, absolutely speaking, if one "engages" on the world stage - there is only greater and lesser consistency. Anyhow, the worst "common-cause" the U.S. has ever made is with Uncle Joe - just think of forced collectivization followed by lend-lease (and other horrors by war's end)! The indulgence of tin-pot despots and potentates of banana-republics pales by comparison, morally and existentially.
And yes, let's have "detente" with the Persian mullahs - who are so rational that they send a young boy to be transformed into a gal, so that one of their fellows can continue his assignations with him/her/it.
In conclusion, and in all affection, you're both - nuts. And, yes, it takes one to know one (or two). Now, back to my lobscouse.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Feb 24, 2005 10:08:48 PM
Paul, I must applaud your ability to find the needle-like afterthought about bringing freedom to others in the haystack of discredited claims about Iraq's arsenal, weapons programs, and status as a threat to the world.
I am not sure what you are speaking about, with regard to the Intifada. Perhaps we should throw away the notion of diplomacy, democratization and peace talks altogether - just look at Northern Ireland, right?
Further, I am not sure what the act which blew the lid off the troubled post-Oslo period, Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to the Haram al-Sharif / Temple Mount, had to do with advancing peace negotiations. (It seemed designed to do quite the opposite.) Beyond that, it is also a complete change of subject from trying to bring economic and political advancement in the absence of a thirty-year armed conflict (or, some might argue, seventy-year), than it is to speak of impotent, often incompetent, partisan efforts to "mediate" such a long-term conflict.
Are you disputing the Bush clan's long-standing, close relationship with the House of Saud? Bush Jr's many personal visits with Prince Abdullah at his Crawford Ranch? Whether or not Moore deserves your derision, the fact of the Bush/Saud relationship, including GW's relationship, seems to be beyond dispute. (And this notion that if somebody is your friend, you have to do everything in the very way that friend would want, and nothing that the friend would dislike? Where does that come from?)
(Sure I'm nuts. But mixed nuts can make a party a lot more interesting.)
Posted by: Aaron at Feb 26, 2005 10:56:33 AM
Freedom for Iraq was scarcely a 'needle-like afterthought' - it was right there in the title of the military operation! More seriously, the actual Executive Order by which Bush sent US forces into action refers to the fifteen-plus UN resolutions Saddam had ignored or violated - resolutions that do refer to ending all ethnic and sectarian persecution and repression in Iraq. The claim - that justifying the invasion on freedom grounds was post hoc - is plausible because we spent so much time talking about WMDs. The reason we spent so long talking about them was that they were the subject on which we knew least. The idea of ending Saddam's tyranny was common currency for both pro and anti camps, hence there was that much less need to talk about it.
PS using Northern Ireland to advertise the benefits of diplomacy and peace talks might not be all that smart. I used to count myself a supporter of the NI peace process, but Sinn Fein IRA's recent behaviour has made me rather more sceptical.
Posted by: Steve K at Feb 27, 2005 12:44:30 PM
Aaron,
I'm glad that we can at least agree that the other is, and we ourselves are, nuts :)
Perhaps I'll weigh in again later with some thoughts, if I can summon the energy.
Steve,
It's great to have a thoughtful comment - and one that agrees with me! Thanks.
Posted by: Paul Craddick at Feb 27, 2005 10:12:18 PM
Steve, the names attached to military operations for public relations purposes are fascinating, but you can never read too much into a title. And the notion that we made WMD's our causus belli, with dramatic presentations to the UN, because we believed we were at our dumbest and most ignorant on that subject? C'mon. As for supporting a peace process, I find that I usually find cause to find the tactics of one side or the other particularly distasteful. But, to understate the obvious, in war you are unlikely to find that your enemy completely shares your values. You can only afford to refuse to negotiate with your enemy if you expect to win, or believe that the benefits of continued warfare will exceed its negative consequences.
Dang... I came back here expecting to declare that Paul had worn me out, and instead find that I won the war of attrition! ;-) (You should have fired one more volley.)
Posted by: Aaron at Mar 5, 2005 11:44:26 AM